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BOOK REVIEWS

Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy, edited by Nicholas D. Smith and
Paul Woodruﬀ. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv and 226.
$50.00 (Cloth).
VICKI LYNN HARPER, St. Olaf College
This groundbreaking collection of essays analyzes the evidence for
Socratic views on reason and religion. Taking the charges of impiety at
Socrates’ trial seriously, it rejects a previously accepted view that the
motives behind Socrates’ conviction were purely political. Most of the
authors (a notable exception is Asli Gocer) agree that Socrates held innovative religious views and that progress towards understanding these
is possible. The project was inspired by a workshop held at the University of Texas at Austin in 1996, “Reason and Religion in Fifth-Century
Greece.” Six of the nine essays included in this volume are published here
for the first time. Three of these, by C. D. C. Reeve, Mark L. McPherran,
and Stephen A. White, grew directly out of presentations at the Austin
workshop. Three more, by Richard Kraut, Asli Grocer and Paul Woodruﬀ,
are on related topics. These six new essays are well complemented by
selections from previously published books by Gregory Vlastos, Robert
Parker, and Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith which helped
to shape the debates. The essays are framed by an informative introduction and, as a grand finale, selections from private correspondence about
Socrates and his daimonion among Vlastos, Brickhouse, McPherran, and
Smith, edited by Woodruﬀ. Both the introduction and the selected correspondence serve to articulate precise questions, and to elucidate the
meaning(s) of key terms defining the issues under debate. In some cases
clarification dissolves apparent disagreement; in others, it reveals more
precisely what the disagreements are.
The issues involved are complex and intertwined. First, there is the
distinction between the historical Socrates, and Socrates as portrayed in
Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues or, more generally, the distinction between
historical analysis of Athenian society and religion, and the interpretation and philosophical evaluation of Plato’s dialogues. Several of the
essays tackle historical questions head on. In chapter 3 (an excerpt from
his 1996 book, Athenian Religion: A History), Robert Parker investigates
the trial of Socrates, and historical questions about Athenian society and
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Greek religion. Noting that, historically, political and religious factors
in Athenian society were intertwined, he concludes that it “will not do,
therefore, to deny a given incident all religious content simply because
political factors also intrude” (p. 42). If Socrates’ piety was a genuine issue at the trial, does it make sense to construe the charges against him as
motivated by concerns about a rationalist threat to traditional religious
beliefs? Parker explores the question whether there was a genuine “religious crisis” in the second half of the fifth century. He rejects the idea that
traditional religion was seriously undermined at that time, and argues
cogently that ancient evidence for a plethora of trials for impiety is unreliable. (Thus he rebuts E. R. Dodds’s well-known view, in The Greeks and the
Irrational (1951), that there was wide-ranging oppression against innovative intellectuals.) Yet Parker does conclude that, in a sense, there was a religious crisis, because speculative thought was seen by some as a religious
threat (p. 46). In chapter 7, “A New Assessment of Socratic Philosophy
of Religion,” Asli Gocer focuses on the paucity of reliable historical evidence and concludes that “no confident conclusion is possible regarding
either the alleged religious crisis, or the extent of the nonconformism of
Socrates” (p. 125). Perhaps not, but plausible speculation about possibilities can be fruitful, and this still leaves plenty of room for the interpretation of Plato’s Socrates. In chapter 9, “Socrates at Colonus: A Hero for the
Academy,” Stephen A. White argues in fascinating detail for the historical
claim that Plato created a new cult at the Academy, honoring Socrates as a
hero while celebrating philosophy as “the highest form of piety” (p. 168).
He assesses this as transformative, in that it changed traditional cult “into
something more humane, more edifying, and more in harmony with Socratic rationalism” (p. 168).
In chapter 1, “Socrates, Politics, and Religion,” Richard Kraut addresses
the historical question of why Socrates was tried and convicted, as well
as the philosophical question of what lessons we should draw from that
event. Kraut argues that the charges against Socrates were motivated by
genuine religious issues, as well as by political considerations. Philosophically, he argues that the trial of Socrates raises a perennial dilemma: “that
there is an unresolvable tension between the claims of the religious or
moral conscience and the legitimate needs of the community” (p. 22). In
this essay Kraut does not address the question of what legitimates a community’s “needs,” though he does explicitly disavow conventional ethical
relativism (p. 20).
Woodruﬀ holds that Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues are anachronistic, in
that Plato’s Socrates expresses fourth-century ideas (chapter 8, “Socrates
and the Irrational”). He argues that Plato’s Socrates rejects both sides
of the fifth-century debate between reason and religion; that he views
the rationalist projects of fifth-century sophists and natural scientists as
failures, but also rejects religion because he makes philosophical activity
and moral consciousness displace the traditional gods. Woodruﬀ argues
that, for Plato’s Socrates, moral sense works through shame, a concept
which he rehabilitates, along with certain aspects of traditional culture.
This is innovative in that it “moves the issues on to new ground, using
rational ideas and methods his rationalist contemporaries had not considered” (pp. 130–31).
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C. D. C. Reeve also focuses on Plato’s Socrates, without taking a stand
on his relation to the historical Socrates (chapter 2: “Socrates the Apollonian?”). In exploring the relation between Plato’s Socrates and Apollo,
Reeve confronts some central issues for the interpretation of Socratic
theology: To what extent is it rational or non-rational, what is Socrates’
daimonion, his divine sign, and how does it relate to the traditional gods
of Greek religion? On the basis of textual analysis of the Apology, Reeve
makes a surprisingly strong case for connecting Socrates’ daimonion with
the Delphic Apollo. This undermines rationalized interpretations, such as
Nussbaum’s analysis of the daimonion as the voice of human reason (Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, edited by D.
Cleary, Vol. 1 (1985): pp. 234–35), but brings to the fore the question why
Socrates’ religious views should have been seen as threatening. Reeve sees
Socratic theology as comprised of both rational and non-rational elements,
but analyzes the daimonion as a Delphic Apollonian blessing upon Socrates’
mission, the rational pursuit of philosophy. He suggests that Socrates’ accuser, Meletus, “is on to something about Socrates, that he has prophetically if inchoately sensed the threat to Greek religion that Socrates’ rationalism poses” (p. 37).
The heart of the debate about how to interpret Socratic theology is
the question whether it views reason as consistent with religious commitments and, if not, what “trumps” what. The question of what is
innovative about Socrates’ theology is related to this. The crux of the matter is sharply stated by Vlastos in chapter 4, “Socratic Piety,” an excerpt
from his classic 1991 work Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher: “Socrates’
commitment to reasoned argument as the final arbiter of claims to truth
in the moral domain is evident throughout Plato’s dialogues. . . . And yet
he is also committed to obeying commands reaching him through supernatural channels” (p. 55). With respect to the first commitment, Vlastos
emphasizes Crito 45b: “Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort
of man who is persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which
appears to me to be best when I reason . . . about it” (translated by Vlastos,
p. 55). How can Socrates see these commitments as consistent? (Vlastos
takes Plato’s Socratic dialogues, supplemented by Xenophon, to be reliable evidence for Socratic thought. I shall not address that issue here.)
According to Vlastos, Socrates’ commitment to his daimonion and divine
signs allows “unlimited scope” (p. 61) for the use of critical reason: “These
two commitments cannot conflict because only by the use of his own critical reason can Socrates determine the true meaning of any of the signs” (p.
62). Moreover, Socrates rationalizes the gods in making them moral and
wise. In interpreting divine will, Socrates must consider what is consistent
with this rationalized conception of divine nature (compare Socrates’ discussion of piety in the Euthyphro). As Vlastos clarifies the point in a letter
to Brickhouse, Socrates would get “personal” or “subjective reassurance”
from his daimonion “only when he already has rational grounds for a certain
action (or belief)” (p. 197).
In chapter 4, “Socrates’ Gods and the Daimonion,” Brickhouse and Smith
argue that whenever Socrates responds to the opposition of his divine sign
by desisting from some contemplated action (e.g., addressing the Assembly at Apology 31c7–d5), his daimonion trumps reason in that it overrides
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“whatever reasons he might have had for taking the action in the first
place” (p. 83). On their view, “Socrates would count certain forms of divination—especially his own daimonion—as providing sources of information that are largely independent of Socrates” own rationcination” (p. 82).
Mark McPherran is also critical of Vlastos’s analysis. In the private correspondence (beautifully edited and usefully prefaced by Woodruﬀ ), he
concludes that “reason does not have complete and free interpretive reign
or primary authority in the case of the daimonion” (Letter 9, McPherran
to Vlastos, p. 187). According to McPherran, “The fact that the daimonion
provides a kind of certain knowledge as well as the grounds for practical
certainty is made apparent by Socrates’ unwavering confidence that the
daimonion is always caused by a divine source that would never purposefully mislead him” (p. 187). Vlastos concedes that “unlimited scope” for
critical reason is too strong; he did not mean to claim that interpretation is
so open-ended that the daimonion’s injunctions have no descriptive content
(Letter 19, Vlastos to Brickhouse, p. 197). But he stoutly maintains that the
daimonion is not an independent, non-rational source of knowledge (Letter 6, Vlastos to McPherran, p. 183). This point raises fundamental epistemological questions about what counts as knowledge, and about what
sort of knowledge Socrates is looking for in the Socratic dialogues. The
correspondence clarifies a diﬀerence between “moral” or “practical” certainty and epistemic certainty. In the end, all parties to the debate, including Mcpherran, reject the idea that Socrates has a dualist epistemology,
“that he thought that there were two kinds of knowledge, fallible knowledge, derivable through elenctic searching, and certain knowledge derivable from a non-rational source, namely divination” (Letter 6, Vlastos to
Mcpherran, p. 183). But the interlocutors agree to disagree on whether
Socrates’ trust in his daimonion is greater than his trust in “the products
of ratiocination” (Letter 22, Vlastos to Smith, p. 199). Part of the trouble
seems to be that there is no clear test case in the dialogues. As Vlastos
maintains, there seems to be no decisive textual support for the hypothetical claim that “if Socrates has rational grounds for doing (or not doing) X
a sign to the contrary from the daimonion would trump them” (Letter 24,
Vlastos to Smith, p. 202).
What is innovative about Socratic theology? Brickhouse and Smith do
not see Socrates’ moralization of the gods as particularly innovative, nor
as a plausible reason for the charges of impiety: “there is no ancient evidence for supposing that his contemporaries were troubled by Socrates’
alleged ethical transformation of the gods” (p. 76). And several of the
authors (McPherran, Brickhouse, and Smith, Reeve, and Woodruﬀ ) discuss ways in which Socrates respects or rehabilitates traditional religious
practices and beliefs. But this is still consistent with McPherran’s eloquent
summation, with which I concur: “Socrates, in short, raised the stakes for
living a life of piety considerably by making its final measure not correct
and timely religious practice, but rather, the actual state of one’s philosophically purified soul” (p. 102).
This collection succeeds admirably in achieving its stated aims (p. 11)
of presenting good recent scholarship on Socrates and religion, and of inviting further reflection upon Socrates’ place in the history of religion, as
well as in the history of philosophy.

